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I. INTRODUCTION
In late October 2003, the United Nations (UN) publicly linked British
diamond mining giant, De Beers, to the looting of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo's (DRC) diamond supply.' According to the UN, two of De
Beers' rough diamond dealers allegedly purchased rough diamonds in the
Candidate,J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 2005; A.B., American Studies, Brandeis
University. The author would like to thank the following for their contribution and support: my family,
Susan Fishman, Amee and A] Fishman, Diane and Jerry Fishman, and Alan Canter; Kelli Vail; Alan C.
Swan, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; and The UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSI-
NESS LAW REVIEW Executive and Editorial Board and members.
1 See Varsha Gupta d'Souza, DR Congo: U.N. Report Takes Sparkle ofDe Beers' Diamonds, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 6, 2003.
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DRC without an accompanying certificate in violation of the newly adopted
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).2 John Oppenheimer,
director of De Beers, vehemently denied De Beers' involvement in any
illegal transactions, and insisted that his company had been found guilty by
association.
3
The KPCS requires the government of the DRC, the nation where the
alleged rough diamond sale occurred, and the government of Great Britain,
the place of De Beers' incorporation, to investigate, and if necessary,
sanction any person or business found guilty of buying, selling, or trading in
uncertified rough diamonds.4 The Scheme requires these nations to
independently, and concurrently, punish violators in an effort to deter the
trade in "blood diamonds"' from continuing.
This article recognizes the international diamond trading community's
commitment to implementing the KPCS in order to end the blood diamond
trade. The basic premise of this article is that, while in theory the goals of
the initiative are sound and feasible, in practice they will fail to solve the
blood diamond trade problem. A system that requires no international
watchdog or universal guidelines, and instead merely suggests ways for
nations to conduct their investigations and punish violators, invites abuse
and inefficiency. Part II provides an explanation of blood diamonds and
demonstrates how trade in thesejewels has fueled rebellion in many African
nations, thus jeopardizing African peace and stability. Part III sets forth the
history of the DRC, illustrating how the blood diamond trade has hindered
the development and strength of many African nations. Part IV describes
the international community's response to the blood diamond problem
through the KPCS, the goals the Scheme seeks to achieve, and specifically,
what the United States (the largest diamond consumer in the world) has
done to comply with the Scheme. Part V argues that while the goals of the
2 See id.
3 See Press Release, De Beers, De Beers and the UN Panel Report on the DRC (Oct. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.debeersgroup.com. In December 2003, British Foreign Office Minister Chris
Mullin stated that in fact De Beers was not guilty of the allegations. See David Pallister, UN 'Snubbed
Over Congo War Breaches': Government Delays Checks on Whether Firms Broke Rules, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
20, 2003.
4 See Kimberly Process: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
s "The term 'blood diamonds' [also known as 'conflict diamonds'] specifically refers to
diamonds that are extracted and exported from particular regions of sub-Saharan Africa ravaged by
vicious armed conflicts. These civil wars are instigated by warlords, renegade militia, and rebel groups
that depend on the illegal sale of blood diamonds in exchange for military weapons, guns, fuel, and
assorted war materials...." Paul Orogun, "Blood Diamonds" andAfrica's Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold War
Era, 166 WORLD AFF. 151, Winter 2004. For purposes of this paper, the term "legitimate diamonds"
means diamonds which are not "blood diamonds" or "conflict diamonds."
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plan are comprehensive in theory, in practice they have not been achieved
and therefore will fail to solve the grassroots blood diamond trade problem.
The paper then suggests ways by which those goals might be achieved.
II. THE BLOOD DIAMOND PROBLEM: FUEL FOR
AFRICAN REBEL FORCE REBELLION
Blood diamonds play a vital role in fueling war in many African nations.
These rough diamonds, also known as conflict diamonds, originate from
nations such as Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC).6 Rebel forces, who oppose the legitimate and recognized
governments of these nations, control much of these countries' diamond
producing areas.' These rebel groups control the mines and sell blood
diamonds in order to buy arms and supply cash flow for their military
actions against such governments, in contravention of United Nations
Security Council resolutions.8
The fungible nature of diamonds, their easy portability and concealment,
as well as inherent high value and demand, make blood diamonds an easy
product to sell on the black market. Worldwide, the blood diamond trade
is worth approximately $300 million a year, comprising between three to
fifteen percent of the total world trade in diamonds.9 However, "these
estimates represent only the ascertainable percentage of [the blood diamond]
trade... [indicating that] the actual percentage may be [much higher]." 0
Despite the overall small value of the blood diamond trade worldwide,
the practice has compromised international peace and human security, and
has hindered the economic and social development of the affected nations."
However, it is important to know that despite the harm inflicted upon
African economic and political stability, trade in conflict diamonds had
6 UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO. & SANCTIONs BRANCH, SEC. COUNCIL AFF.
Div., DEP'T OF POL. AFF., Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, at
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2001).
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, I'TO Obligations, and the
Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 25 (Winter 2003).
10 Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the
Universality Debate, 12 MINN.J. GLOBALTRADE 1, 25 (Winter 2003) (citing ian Smillie, et al, The Heart
of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security (Partnership Africa Canada, Ontario, Can.), Jan.
2000, at §1.2, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/heartmatter.html (estimating that African rebel
groups may supply as much as twenty percent of the world's diamond market)).
n See Kimberley Process: Background, at httpV/www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=
background (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
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helped the legitimate diamond industry prosper for many years, and was not
viewed as an international problem. For decades, De Beers and other
legitimate diamond companies actually traded with rebel groups and profited
from this practice. 2 The funds received from the sale of these diamonds
meant war for African nations. But the sales also meant an increased supply
of diamonds available for sale on the legitimate diamond market. 3 As a
result, diamond trade with rebel groups was not, until recently, deterred by
international law. 
14
III. BLOOD DIAMONDS AND THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Blood diamond trade has greatly affected the nations of Sierra Leone,
Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 5 While their
direct histories differ, the impact of the trade on each nation's development
is the same. The following case study of the DRC provides a closer look
into the devastating effects of the blood diamond trade.
As one of the world's most important diamond producing countries,
16
diamonds serve as one of the DRC's greatest economic resources.
17
However, as much as eighty-five percent of Congolese diamonds are
smuggled out of the country and not reported to the DRC government,
depriving millions of dollars from the nation's gross domestic product.'"
Each year, at least forty million dollars in taxes go unpaid, leaving the DRC
12 See Trade in African Diamonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Rep. Tony P. Hall, Member, House Comm. on Ways
and Means).
13 See id.
14 See id. (commenting that diamond traders were willing to trade with rebels throughout the
1990s, and specifically that "[flor eight years, traders dealt gladly with rebels who tried to overthrow
Sierra Leone's elected government, and briefly succeeded.").
15 See The Kimberley Process, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Feb. 17,2005).
16 In the 1930s, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, a leader in the De Beers Diamond Cartel concluded
that control over the diamond mines in the then called Belgium Congo was the key to the cartel's control
of world production. Edward Jay Epstein, Have You Ever Tried to Sell a Diamond, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY ONLINE (February 1982), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/82feb/8202
diamondl. See Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/country_ profiles/1072684.stm (last updated Jan. 8, 2005); Country Profile: Democratic Republic of
Congo, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/countryprofiles/1076399.stm (last updated
Feb. 16, 2005).
17 D.R. Congo to Set up Certification Scheme for Diamonds, at http://www.conflictdiamonds.com/
pages/Newsarchive/27_04_00.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
18 Price, supra note 9, at 26 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (Statistic
provided by Congressman Tony Hall on the floor of the H.R.)).
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government without benefit of one of its greatest economic resources." The
diamond, a resource which could potentially improve the economic status
of the DRC, has instead thrown the country into the center of Africa's
"world war."20
The recent history of the DRC begins in 1960. After sixty years of
Belgium colonization, the Congo21 gained its independence.' Independence
in a land of vast natural resources, however, did not guarantee peace and
stability. Following five volatile and turbulent years,' Joseph Mobutu, a
rebel leader, gained control of the DRC after a coup d'etat, and established
a strong dictatorship that lasted for the next thirty years.24 In 1971, he
renamed the nation "Zaire."
25
In the early 1980s, Mobutu abruptly ended an exclusive contract
between Zaire and a subsidiary of De Beers in order to exploit his nation's
diamond resources through more lucrative deals.26 Regardless of the actual
intent behind this change, the sudden removal of De Beers from Zaire's
diamond industry drastically undercut the stability of the diamond market,
demonstratingjust how valuable diamonds were to the economic welfare of
the country.27 After a brutal conflict between rebels and Mobutu's
government soldiers, Mobutu's reign ended between 1996 and 1997.28
In February 1997, the United Nations attempted to establish peace in
Zaire through a five-point plan calling for: (1) the cessation of hostilities; (2)
the withdrawal of all external forces; (3) the reaffirmation of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Zaire; (4) the protection of all refugees and
displaced persons; and (5) the rapid and peaceful settlement of the conflict
through dialogue, the electoral process, and an international conference on
19 Id.
20 See Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 16; See Country Profile: Democratic Republic
of Congo, supra note 16.
21 Over the last 50 years, the DRC had been called Belgian Congo, Congo, Zaire, as well as the
DRC. Congo, Democratic Republic ofthe, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0198161.html (lastvisited
Feb. 19, 2005).
22 See Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 16; See Country Profile: Democratic Republic
of Congo, supra note 16 (providing a background summary ofthe DRC's history, politics, and economics).
23 In the five years following the Congo's independence from Belgium, armed forces threatened
the stability of the nation, ending with a military coup, which resulted in the assassination of the
country's Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. See GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO FROM
LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY, 95 (2002).
24 See CH. DIDIER GONDOLA, THE HISTORYOF CONGO, 128-29 (2002).
25 See id. at 142.
26 See Epstein, supra note 16.
27 See id.
28 See GONDOLA, supra note 24, at 159-62.
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peace in the region.29 Despite these efforts for peace, rebels, led by Laurent-
D6sir6 Kabila, captured eastern Zaire, and then the capital.30 Kabila named
himself president, and changed the country's name back to the "Democratic
Republic of the Congo."
31
Despite the new government under Kabila, rebellion in the DRC
continued. Kabila's "[p]romise of a new Congo without Mobutism re-
mained unfulfilled..." and the economy continued to falter.32 In an effort
to improve the economy, Kabila entered into a new agreement with Rwanda
and Uganda to exploit the DRC's natural resources through an intricate
network of mining companies and financial institutions.33 Diamonds were
a vital aspect of this plan.
By 1998, this political and financial endeavor fell apart when, "Rwanda
and Uganda encouraged [an] anti-Kabila group, the Congolese Democratic
Rally... to take arms against [Kabila], 3 4 and to support this uprising by
trading rough diamonds for arms and money. The rebellion eventually
evolved into a complex full scale civil war involving seven African nations.35
In April 1999, the United Nations called for a cease-fire,36 which was
eventually complied with by August 1999.31 Under the terms of the Lusaka
Peace Agreement cease-fire, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe agreed with the DRC to stop fighting and to withdraw their
forces from the DRC.38
The 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement, however, created a misperception
of peace. Anti-Kabila rebel groups residing in the DRC did not fully
comply, and they continue to wreak havoc, violence, and turmoil in the
country.39 In December 2000, the United Nations Security Council
expressed "serious concern" over the humanitarian crisis and again called for
the immediate withdrawal of all Rwandan and Ugandan forces. 4° As of May
29 See S.C. Res. 1097, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3741st mtg. 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1097 (1997).
30 See GONDOLA, supra note 24, at 161.
31 NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 23, at 1.
32 GONDOLA, supra note 24, at 166.
33 See id. at 167.
34 Id.
35 These nations include: The DRC, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe. Id.
36 See S.C. Res. 1234, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3993d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1234 (1999).
37 Bush Speaks Death Penalty Gaffe at http://home.mindspring.com/-katrap/LAGAI/
UVMarch2001 .htm.
38 See GONDOLA, supra note 24, at 171.
39 See S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4247th mtg. 10 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1332
(2000). See also U.N. Security Council "Concerned" by Resumption of Fighting in DR Congo, Agence France-
Presse, Dec. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24786586.
40 See U.N. Security Council "Concerned" by Resumption of Fighting in DR Congo, supra note 39.
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2002, the U.N. had verified that only Namibia had withdrawn all of its
combat troops from the DRC.41
Since 1998 over 3 million people have died as a result of the continued
fighting.42 Despite the nation's potential wealth from its vast resources in
diamonds, cobalt, and timber, sixteen million people were reported starving
in 2001, while two out of every five children died in infancy.43 In October
2002, a United Nations Panel of Experts reported that, although the Seven-
Nation War had diminished in strength, the overlapping conflicts it created
still continue." The rebel factions associated with the armies of Uganda,
Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and the anti-Kabila groups in the DRC continue to
benefit from the conflicts over natural resources, including rough
diamonds .4
By December 2003, however, Kabila formed a "unity" government,
which most of the DRC rebel groups joined, in an effort to stabilize the
nation.46 "[The] new government includes four vice presidents and thirty-
six ministers, sixteen of [whom] are former rebels." 47 Despite the good
intentions of this "unity of rebels"' to promote peace and stability in the
DRC, the old corrupt culture of the DRC continues under the new, broad-
based government.48 The effort at unity has proven unfulfilled. Violence
still terrorizes the nation.49 In May 2004, an insurgency located in an eastern
city of the DRC erupted, resulting in a resurgence of Rwandan support for
various rebel groups fighting against the new DRC government.'0 While at
least some rebels are working with the government rather than against it, the
propensity of rebel groups to rise up against any government they disapprove
of is not likely to disappear.
41 See Report of the Security Council Mission to the Great Lakes Regions, 27 April-7 May 2002, U.N.
SCOR, 56th Sess., 3406th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2002/537 (2002).
42 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 157.
43 See Congo in Dire Trouble, Say Agencies, BBC News, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/1477003.stm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
44 See Final Report ofthe Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 1146th mtg. 12, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1146 (2002).
45 See id.
46 See Carter Dougherty, Sfiting Through a Dark Business; Does Congo's Diamond Trade Defy Change?
Kimberley Reforms may not be Working Fully, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 8, 2003, at 34.
47 Congo, Democratic Republic of the, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0198161.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005).
48 Dougherty, supra note 46.
49 See Congo, Democratic Republic of the, supra note 47.
50 See id.
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IV. TAKING A STAND TO END BLOOD DIAMOND TRADE
A) The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The turbulent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
is very much a product of the blood diamond trade; a trade that has been the
essential fuel for a bitter war adversely affecting national stability and
regional peace. The recently established peace in Sierra Leone and in
Angola, as well as the cease-fire in the DRC, has slightly helped to decrease
the trade in conflict diamonds.51 Moreover, the diamond industry itself has
finally recognized the continued need for a system to protect legitimate
worldwide channels of diamond distribution from blood diamonds.5 2 It is
this recognition that has resulted in the development of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) for diamonds.
Negative publicity, growing public awareness about the existence of
blood diamonds, and pressure from non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) motivated the South African government to summon all interested
governments, members of the diamond industry, and NGOs, to meet and
discuss ways to solve the blood diamond problem.54 The efforts of this
group became known as "The Kimberley Process. ''55 In December 2000,
after gaining worldwide recognition, "all 191 members of the United
Nations General Assembly voted unanimously to support the [P] rocess."
5 6
Two years later, on November 5, 2002, thirty-nine diamond-trading
5 7
nations5 8 officially adopted the KPCS, through the Interlaken Declaration,
5 9
51 See THE WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS 10 (2003) available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncilcom/Kimberley%
20Process%201mplementation%2OGuide.pdf [hereinafter Essential Guide].
52 See id.




57 As of February 2003, the Kimberley Process included forty-four countries, accounting for
approximately 98% of the production and global trade in rough diamonds. See WTO Goods Council
Approves Kimberley Process Waiver, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Feb, 27, 2003, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weeldy/03-02-27/story3.htm.
58 As of April 2005, the following states participate in the Kimberley Process, having met the
minimum requirements of the KPCS: Angola, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Central African Republic, People's Republic of China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote
d'viore, Croatia, the European Community, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Israel, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Democratic Republic of Laos, Lethoso, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Norway, Romania,
Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. See
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a declaration designed to formally recognize and address the conflict
diamond problem,60 in order to protect the approximate $7 billion legitimate
diamond trade and business. 61  Named after the South African city of
Kimberley, the KPCS supplements the existing United Nations sanctions
targeted at preventing the blood diamond trade. 62
The KPCS establishes a mandatory certification system for all rough
diamonds, in order to break the link between rough diamond trade and
armed conflict in African nations like the DRC.63 The purpose of such a
certification scheme is to make it more difficult for warlords, rebel militias,
and rogue regimes to flood the international market with diamonds,
meaning that diamonds will no longer serve as a means of funding revolts.'
Overall, the KPCS seeks to help African countries regain control of their
potentially great natural wealth, which in turn will foster political stability,
economic diversity, and growth. 61 International recognition of the need for
a program like the KPCS demonstrates the importance of the diamond
industry to the economies of many African nations.
OnJanuary 1, 2003, the Scheme was simultaneously implemented by all
participating nations.66 The KPCS requires each participating nation to
Kimberley Process: List of Participants, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=
participants&PHPSESSID=8fl5b6bb4b3bebfa72fb4853a8f8t2lc (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
59 This document formally declared the commitment of the above-mentioned nations to
promote prosperity through the diamond trade and to work to end the blood diamond trade. See
INTERLAKEN DECLARATION OF 5 NOVEMBER 2002 ON THE KiMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION
SCHEME FOR ROUGH DIAMONDS, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www-docs/plenary_
meetings9/interlaken_declaration.pdf.
60 See id.
61 See generally, World Diamond Council: Productivity, at http;//www.worlddiamondcouncil.com
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
62 See Price, supra note 9, at 69 n.9 (stating that "Diamonds from Angola, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia are subject to mandatory UNSC sanctions, pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 1127 (1997), 1306
(2000), and 1343 (2001), respectively."). See generally Angola (UNITA) Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R.
pt. 590 (2001); Illicit Diamonds, Conflict and Terrorism: The Role of U.S. Agencies in Fighting the Conflict
Diamond Trade, Subcomm. on Oversight ofGov't Mgmt., Restructuring, and the District of Columbia
of the Comm. on Governmental Aff., 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Alan W.
Eastham, Special Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds, Bureau of Econ. and Bus. Aff.) (stating that the
Kimberley Process will "supplement and enhance the Security Council measures").
63 See generally, The Kimberley Process, supra note 15.
64 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 154.
65 For example, in Sierra Leone, since the rebel disarmament and restoration of control of the
diamond mines to the government of Sierra Leone, the country's gross domestic product increased by
5.4 percent and inflation decreased sharply to three percent. See IMF UnblocksAidfor Sierra Leone, BBC
News, available at http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1870259.stm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
66 See Kimberley Process for Rough Diamonds- Background, at
https://mmsdl.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleyprocess/intro e.asp (last visited April 10, 2005).
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enact legislation putting the following authorities in place: "a requirement
that all shipments of rough diamonds imported to or exported from [the
nation is] certified under the scheme[,]... trade prohibitions, banning the
trade in rough diamonds with [non-participating countries]," 67 an official
commitment reflecting and upholding the goals of the KPCS, and to meet
annually to discuss and monitor the progress of the program.68 The KPCS
does not, however, require each participating nation to provide any official
means for enforcing this legislation. 69 As a result, much discretion is left in
the hands of each participating nation.
The KPCS requires that each import or export of rough diamonds be
transported in a tamper-resistant container and accompanied by a
government-validated Kimberly Process Certificate, which attests that the
diamonds are not blood diamonds."0 These certificates seek to ensure that
diamonds traded through the "diamond pipeline""' are not the product of
rebel groups, and that the diamonds in each "shipment have been handled
in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme."72 Each certificate must be resistant to forgery, with the country of
origin clearly labeled on parcels of unmixed diamonds.73  Various
identifications must be included, such as a unique tracking number, dates of
issuance and expiration, the issuing authority, the identity of the exporter or
importer, carat weight, the United States dollar value, and a description of
the shipment's contents.7 4 The KPCS restricts diamond trade to only certified
diamonds, and prohibits trade between KPCS participants and non-
participants.
7 5
In addition to the Kimberley Process Certificate, the World Diamond
Council, a leading diamond organization, proposed, and the Kimberley
Process participants endorsed, a system of warranties, whereby all buyers
and sellers of both rough and polished diamonds must make the following
67 See id.
68 See generally, The Kimberley Process, supra note 15.
69 See id.
70 See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 1.
71 The "diamond pipeline" refers to the various stages a diamond goes through before ultimately
reaching the consumer. The pipeline begins at diamond mines on four continents, in about twenty-six
countries. Diamonds are then processed in one of approximately thirty countries, and then sold
throughout the world. See Price, supra note 9 at 69 n.19. See also World Diamond Council: Presenta-
tions: White House Conference (Jan.10, 2001), available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com.
72 Official statement that must be included on every certificate. See Kimberley Process:
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 4.
73 See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 1.
74 See id. See also Kimberley Process: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 4.
75 See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 3.
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affirmative statement on all invoices: "The diamonds herein invoiced have
been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and
in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller hereby
guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal
knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these
diamonds. 76 Once a certified shipment has entered its intended country,
the shipment may be traded, in whole or in part, and mixed with other
parcels of certified rough diamonds as long as all subsequent trades or sales
are also accompanied by the necessary warranties.77 Rough diamond dealers
within a country's borders are expected to comply with the same guidelines
for warranties as importing and exporting dealers, except that the rough
diamond dealers need not include the Kimberley Process Certificate.7" They
only need ensure that the rough diamonds purchased are from venders who
can provide an invoice with the warranties declaration.79 The invoice must
read, "The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate
sources not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United
Nations resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are
conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees
provided by the supplier of these diamonds."8° Failure to comply with these
procedures can lead to confiscation of the diamonds or the rejection of
parcels offered for sale, and criminal sanctions against the importer or
exporter.8' In order to participate in the Scheme, countries needed to
comply and implement legislation by July 31, 2003, or face isolation from
the legitimate diamond-trading worldY
In addition to national compliance with the KPCS, diamond industry
organizations and their members adopted a system of self-regulation. 3
Additionally, leading international organizations within the diamond
industry, such as the World Diamond Council, Jewelers of America, the
76 Id at 2.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 5.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 3.
82 See Conflict Prevention: Final Communique, available at
httpV'/www.humansecurity.gc.ca/conflictprevsuncity-en.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
V These diamond industry organizations have pledged to trade onlywith companies that include
warranty declarations on their invoices, to refuse to buy diamonds from suspect sources or unknown
suppliers or from nations that have not implemented the KPCS, to refuse to buy diamonds from any
sources that, after a legally binding due process system, have been found to have violated government
regulations, to not knowingly buy or sell or assist others in buying or selling conflict diamonds, and to
ensure that all company employees be kept abreast as to trade resolutions and government restrictions
restricting the trade in conflict diamonds. See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 2-3.
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World Federation of Diamond Bourses, and the International Diamond
Manufacturers Association, vowed to expel any trader found trading in
contravention of the KPCS from the diamond industry.' To avoid abuses
and to ensure that the system of warranties is both employed and effective,
the World Diamond Council requested that diamond jewelry retailers insist
that their suppliers provide warranties for all diamonds polished after
January 1, 2003.85
In addition to the diamonds currently being excavated from diamond
mines, the KPCS drafters recognized that billions of dollars worth of rough
and polished diamonds presently exist in industry inventories, as well as in
the hands of past consumers. Both of these diamond supplies may easily re-
enter the marketplace over time. Instead ofconfiscating all diamonds mined
and sold pre-January 1, 2003, the drafters recommended that all owners of
such diamonds in the market to sell these diamonds stipulate to the best of
their ability that the diamonds are not blood diamonds and indicate the place
of origin, preferably with a statement from the seller attesting to this fact.86
The World Diamond Council suggests sellers of diamonds that pre-date
January 1, 2003 include a statement saying: "The diamonds herein invoiced
have been purchased prior to January 1, 2003 from sources that, to the best
of our knowledge, are reliable. The seller hereby guarantees that they have
no personal knowledge or reason to believe that these diamonds are involved
in funding conflict and/or have been traded in violation of any United
Nations Resolution.
8 7
In early April 2003, in Johannesburg, South Africa, KPCS participants
met for their first Plenary Meeting,88 to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the KPCS. 89 Representatives in attendance from NGOs 90 welcomed the
international commitment made to taking additional effective steps to break
the link between diamonds and human rights violations and conflict in
Africa.91 However, the meeting revealed that several governments failed to
84 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 160.
85 See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 9.
86 Id. at 9.
7 Id.
88 The Plenary Meetings are the annual meetings that all members of the KPCS must attend in
order to be good standing participants.
89 News Release: Kimberley Process Still in Process: Progress Made, but Key Issues Remain, AMNESTY
USA (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2003/world04302003.html.
90 These NGOs included: Action Aid (UK and Sierra Leone, Amnesty International
(International Secretariat), Cenadep (DRC), Fatal Transactions (The Netherlands), Global Witness
(UK), Network Movement for Justice and Development (Sierra Leone), Oxfam International,
Partnership Africa Canada, World Vision (USA), among others. Id.
91 See id.
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implement a system of regular and independent monitoring of all partici-
pants; a measure necessary to ensure that the Process does not become
abused.92 Despite this revelation, no action was taken at the meeting to esta-
blish any regular monitoring mechanism to assess all national diamond con-
trol systems over time, which would thereby meet consumer expectations
of trust and credibility. 93
Troubled by the lack of progress made, the NGOs called for the
strengthening of four critical elements of the Kimberley Process:
monitoring, membership criteria, participant coordination, and accurate
collection of trade and production statistics. 94 During the October Plenary
Meeting, in an effort to increase the Kimberley Process' credibility and
force, and to address the concerns of the NGOs, the participating nations
agreed to establish a peer review mechanism. 95  This would create a
comprehensive framework for monitoring implementation of the process,
through a combination of reporting, voluntary "review visits," and "review
missions" to participating nations. 96 The mechanism includes a clear
requirement that all participants report annually on the implementation of
the Scheme within the participating nation.97 While reporting is required,
review visits to participating nations is voluntary, however, the participating
nations agreed it would be "desirable for the largest number of participants
possible to volunteer to receive a review visit. '98 The "review missions"
would be conducted in an impartial manner by other members of the KPCS,
and would report their findings to the current Chair of the KPCS.99 The
DRC, in particular, indicated its desire to hold discussions on statistics, and
to host review visits during the coming year.'
00
To date, the first and only country to face expulsion from the KPCS is
the Republic of Congo, due to a discrepancy between the millions of dollars
worth of uncut diamonds exported from the country and the minimal




95 See Kimberly Process, Final Communiqu6: Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Sun City,
South Africa, 29-31 October2003, at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/wwwdocs/plenary_




99 See The Kimberley Process: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 15.
100 Kimberly Process, Final Communiqu& Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Sun City, South
Africa, 29-31 October 2003, supra note 95.
101 See Nicole Itano, Diamond Trade Cleans Up: Last Week 43 Nations Agree to Stop Trading with the
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suspicions that the country served as a clearinghouse for conflict
diamonds..." resulting in its July 9, 2004 expulsion. 10 2 However, on Oct,
7, 2004, the Chair of the Kimberley Process and the Government of the
Republic of Congo issued a joint statement indicating that based on the
Republic of Congo's recognition that it improperly utilized the Kimberley
Process certificates, and its promise to implement policies and legislative
measures to address this problem, the Chair welcomed the Republic of
Congo to continue its efforts in order to re-integrate into the Kimberly
Process.'03 Therefore, provided the Republic of Congo keeps its promise to
"put in place policies and legislative measures" to address the problems
which resulted in their expulsion, the Republic of Congo likely will again be
recognized as a participating nation.104
As of April 2005, forty-three states and regional economic integration
organizations have met the minimum requirements of the KPCS. 1°5 An
additional twenty states have applied for membership and are currently
attempting to meet the requirements of the Scheme.0 6
B) The United States Takes A Role: The Clean Diamond Trade Act
As the world's largest marketplace for diamonds and leading con-
sumer, 107 the United States recognized that without its participation in the
quest to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds, world trade in legitimate
diamonds would face the threat of consumer backlash.' If the United
States did not participate in the KPCS, the world's largest consumer of
diamonds would face isolation from the non-conflict diamond-trading
world.'0 9 Without participating, the United States would only be able to
purchase diamonds from other non-participating nations, therefore
Congo Republic, a Source of Illicit Diamonds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 2004, at 7.
102 Id.
103 See Meeting Between the Chair and the Republic of Congo Joint Statement, Oct. 7, 2004.
104 See id.
105 These include: Angola, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Central African Republic, People's Republic of China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Iviore,
Croatia, the European Community, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Democratic Republic of Laos, Lethoso, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Norway, Romania, Russian
Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. See Kimberley
Process: List of Participants, supra note 58.
106 Id.
107 American consumers buy two-thirds of all the world's diamonds. Trade in African Diamonds,
supra note 12.
108 See 19 U.S.C.A. §3901(6) (2003).
109 See id.
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supporting blood diamond trade and further damaging the economies of
diamond producing nations affected by the conflict diamond trade."'
Moreover, refraining from participation would penalize members of the
legitimate trade."' The United States realized its obligation to help sever the
link between diamonds and conflict and the need to press for the
implementation of an effective solution." 2 In fiscal year 2000, over $800
million in rough diamonds entered the United States from fifty-three
countries, 113 significantly contributing to the United States estimated $26
billionjewelry industry. 1 4 Recognizing the importance of the initiative, the
United States joined the KPCS to work toward ending the blood diamond
trade."'
As per the KPCS requirement,"16 on April 25, 2003, the United States
Senate and House of Representatives passed the Clean Diamond Trade
Act."7 The Act bans the importation of uncertified diamonds into the
United States in an effort to guarantee that conflict diamonds stay out of the
country. 118 On July, 30, 2003, President Bush signed the Clean Diamond
Trade Act, just one day before the deadline for implementing the certifica-
tion process passed."19
In passing the Bill, Congress recognized that "funds derived from the
sale of rough diamonds are being used by rebel and state actors to finance
military activities, overthrow governments, subvert international efforts to
promote peace and stability, and commit horrifying atrocities against
unarmed civilians." 20 Additionally, Congress acknowledged that during the
past decade, war over the control of diamond mining areas forced more than
110 "Failure to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds or to differentiate between the trade in
conflict diamonds and the trade in legitimate diamonds could have a severe negative impact on the
legitimate diamond trade in countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania." 19
U.S.C.A. §3901(7) (2003).
III See id.
112 See 19 U.S.C.A. §3901(5) (2003).
113 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-2-02-425T, International Trade: Significant Challenges
Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict Diamonds: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt,
Restructuring and the Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on Gov't Aff, U.S. Senate 11 (2002)(statement of Loren
Yager, Director, Internal Affairs and Trade), available at www.gao.gov.
114 See Price, supra note 9, at 42.
115 See generally 19 U.S.C.A. §3901 (2003).
116 Under the terms ofthe Kimberley Process, each participating nation must implement national
certification schemes through legislation. See Kimberly Process: Background, supra note 11.
117 See 19 U.S.C.A. §3901 (2003).
118 See id.
119 Victoria Gomelsky, U.S. Kimberley Legislation MakesJuly3l Deadline: Twenty-three Countries Do
Not Meet Compliance Requirements, NAT'LJEWELER, Sept. 1, 2003, at 6.
120 19 U.S.C.A. §3901(1) (2003).
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6.5 million people from their homes in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the DRC,
resulting in roughly 3.7 million deaths.
121
To guarantee that buyers and sellers of rough diamonds in the United
States adhere to the requirements of the law, the Clean Diamond Trade Act
grants the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection import-
ing authority, and grants exporting authority to the Bureau of the Census.1
22
Both bureaus are given an updated list of all participating nations to ensure
that no diamond is imported from, or exported to, a non-participating
nation. 123
With regard to diamonds entering the country, the United States Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection instructs its Field Operators, including
all Port Directors, Trade Specialists, Inspectors, and Import and Entry
Specialists, to ensure that an original Kimberley Process Certificate accom-
panies every shipment of rough diamonds entering the nation. 2 4 The
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection defines an original Kimberley
Process Certificate as a "tamper and forgery resistant document," that bears
identifying information about the parcel, as well as the KPCS compliance
statement. 125 The shipment of rough diamonds must be imported from a
participating nation in a sealed and tamper-resistant container, defined as a
"packaging having an indicator or barrier to entry that could reasonably be
expected to provide visible evidence that tampering had occurred."
126
A Customs official has the right to demand that an importer provide the
appropriate certificate, and if the certificate is missing or the diamonds are
not contained in the proper container, the parcel must be seized by the
Customs official and stored in a permanent storage vault. 127 If a shipment
of rough diamonds from a non-participating country reaches the United
States,128 these diamonds will be seized and barred from entering the
121 See id.
122 "For purposes of this Act-(1) the importing authority shall be the United States Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection... (2) the exporting authority shall be the Bureau of the Census." 19
U.S.C.A. S3905(a) (2003).
123 19 U.S.C.A. S3905(b) (2003).
124 See Memorandum from Exec. Dir., Trade Compliance and Facilitation, to Directors, Field
Operations of the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/inkhandler/cgov/import/commercial-enforcement/rough diamonds.ctt/rough_
diamonds.doc (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
125 Id.; These requirements are essentially the same as those promulgated by the World Diamond
Council. See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 1.
126 Memorandum from Exec. Dir., supra note 24.
127 Id.
128 The Customs official must refer to the list of participants, made available by the President in
the Federal Register, in order to determine whether the shipment comes from a participating nation.
19 U.S.C.A. S3905(b) (2003).
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country.129 United States law imposes a civil penalty up to $10,000 upon any
person who violates or attempts to violate, any license, order or regulation. 1
30
A willful or attempted violation, upon conviction, attaches a maximum fine
of $50,000, or maximum prison sentence of 10 years, or both. 131 The United
States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the United States
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement are authorized to enforce
the provisions of the law, and can bring charges against any violator.'3 2
The passage and practice of the Clean Diamond Trade Act demonstrates
the United States' commitment to ending the blood diamond trade. No
individual, however, has been tried or convicted in the United States for
attempting, or actually importing or exporting, uncertified diamonds.
13
Therefore, to date, an assessment of the Act's actual effectiveness in
punishing and deterring blood diamond trade cannot be made. But, by
passing the Act, the United States took a stand to end its involvement in the
blood diamond trade, and recognized the importance of its participation in
the success of the KPCS. The Act tells those who trade in contravention of
the KPCS that, as ofJuly 2003, the world's largest consumer of diamonds
will no longer trade with just anybody. As the world's leading consumer,
the United States plays an intricate role in the success of the KPCS.
V. WHY THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME IS NOT
ENDING THE BLOOD DIAMOND TRADE
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) seeks to break the
link between trade in blood diamonds and armed conflict in much ofAfrica,
and in doing so help nations, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), regain possession and control over their natural resources in order
to promote stability, diversity, and overall national growth.'34 While forty-
three nations currently participate in the Scheme, and another twenty are
129 Memorandum from Exec. Dir., supra note 124. However, the Secretary of State may waive
the prohibition of imports from a non-participating country. If such a waiver has occurred, "...[t]he
Secretary of State will publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying any country.. to which [the'
waiver applies and [indicating] the relevant time period during which the waiver will apply." Id.
130 19 U.S.C.A. §3907(a)(1) (2003).
131 19 U.S.C.A. 53907(a)(2) (2003).
132 "The United States Bureau ofCustoms and Border Protection and the United States Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement are authorized, as appropriate, to enforce the provisions of
subsection (a) of this section and to enforce the laws and regulations governing exports of rough
diamonds, including with respect to the validation ofthe Kimberley Process Certificate by the exporting
authority." 19 U.S.C.A. §3907(c) (2003).
133 This statistic is correct as ofJanuary 2005.
134 See generally Kimberley Process: Background, supra note 11.
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taking steps to meet the criteria necessary to become trading members of
certified diamonds, 135 this international commitment to ending the blood
diamond trade has failed, and is likely to continue to fail in providing
enough structure to truly cease blood diamond trade. Already, the Republic
of Congo has been expelled from the Kimberley Process, 136 indicating that
maintaining the requirements of the process may prove more difficult than
anticipated by the KPCS drafters. As currently implemented, the KPCS is
nothing more than a voluntary agreement between nations that lacks the
strength necessary to compel uniform global compliance. In order for the
KPCS to be successful, tighter control and stricter requirements over all
aspects of the diamond pipeline are necessary.
A) The Road Is But a Path
The blood diamond trade problem is a worldwide problem. As a result,
the KPCS seeks to endglobal trade in blood diamonds; therefore, in order for
the Scheme to truly be effective, global participation is imperative. How-
ever, despite unanimous support for the Scheme from all members of the
United Nations General Assembly,' 37 only forty-three nations, with twenty
more attempting to meet the criteria for membership,' 38 currently partici-
pate. The commitment of approximately sixty-three nations by no means
amounts to global participation. In order to increase the muscle of the
Scheme, the United Nations must fervently encourage all nations to partici-
pate. With more United Nations encouragement, the KPCS will have the
clout and power necessary to achieve its goals.
B) The Road Needs Patrolling
The Scheme currently does not provide for an independent monitoring
system to ensure that each nation actually complies with the regulations and
suggestions of the KPCS. "' Global Witness, a leading NGO, has argued that
certifying parcels of gemstones as conflict-free is not enough supervision. 40
They assert that without an independent monitoring and supervisory agency
institutionalized to oversee the conduct and business practices of the
diamond industry, ample opportunities for corruption and diamond
135 This statistic is correct as ofJanuary 2005. See id.
136 See Itano, supra note 101.
137 See Essential Guide, supra note 51, at 11.
138 This statistic is correct as ofJanuary 2005. See Kimberley Process: Background, supra note 11.
139 See SA Must Push AU for Diamond Watchdog, S. AR. PRESS AWS'N, May 7, 2003.
140 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 160.
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laundering exist.14" ' In addition, they worry that "...the use of the proceeds
from such.. .activities [will] continue to fund the purchase of arms for rebel
militias to unleash their reign of terror on the citizens of war-devastated
African countries." 14 2 Without an actual enforcement requirement or an
international monitoring system, many nations may opt out of fully
enforcing their laws against the blood diamond trade. The institution of an
independent monitoring system is a necessary measure to ensure better
compliance with the KPCS. While the KPCS does currently provide for a
system of voluntary peer review,1 43 the fact that the KPCS itself is voluntary
does not provide enough structure to ensure compliance. One way to solve
this problem is, again, through greater participation of the United Nations.
Creating a task force or commissioning an organization to keep a closer
watch on all participating nations (that has the power to sanction those
which do no not comply with the fullest force possible) may serve as a
monitoring system that can eradicate some of the current problems with
compliance.
Additionally, while the diamond industry has pledged to monitor itself
and only buy and sell diamonds that are in compliance with the KPCS, as
currently drafted, the KPCS does not permit a private right of action
whereby an individual can bring suit against another person or company
violating the KPCS. By allowing such a private right of action, the members
of the industry themselves would be able to more actively participate in the
prevention of the blood diamond trade, and would serve as an additional
"check" on the system. Moreover, fear of being personally prosecuted for
a violation would deter industry persons from trading, selling, or buying
conflict diamonds.
C) Punishments for Violations Need to be Uniform
The current punishment requirement of the KPCS serves as yet another
flaw of the Scheme. As drafted, the KPCS places no specific international
or domestic enforcement duty upon participating nations, and instead allows
each nation to implement its own punishment mechanism.' In theory, as
long as each nation implements similar punishments, then this requirement
poses no problem. However, nothing in the KPCS requires uniformity of
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 The KPCS does not require "Peer review" of its participants, however, will provide such a
service for those participating nations who choose to participate in it. See The Kimberley Process:
Kimberley Structure, supra note 15.
144 See supra Part IV.
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punishment or that any punishment is actually enforced.'4 5 Therefore, a
blood diamond trader in one participating nation might receive a penalty as
extreme as capital punishment, while a blood diamond trader in another
participating country could face little more than a slap on the wrist. Under
the terms of the Scheme as currently drafted, however, both nations are
complying with the requirements for membership and are considered
participants in good standing. A mechanism that allows for such a wide
range of punishments will not deter blood diamond trading, but rather may
have the adverse affect and actually encourage such traders to choose to trade
in a country with softer punishments. Therefore, the current Scheme is
nothing more than a "watchdog without teeth,"'46 doing nothing to ensure
that each participating nation implements effective control over its diamond
supply and actually punishes blood diamond traders. While the power to
decide how to punish criminals remains the sovereign right of every nation,
at least some minimum punishment must uniformly be required of every
participating country. Just as the KPCS requires certain information to be
supplied on every shipment of diamonds in and out of each participating
nation, so too must the KPCS require a minimum punishment for violators.
As encouragement for implementing and upholding such punishments,
studies should be undertaken in order to demonstrate the positive effects
that keeping checks on offenders has toward deterring the blood diamond
trade.'47 In order for the Scheme to be effective, both in theory and in prac-
tice, stricter guidelines for punishment must be included in the KPCS itself
Success of the KPCS depends not only upon the commitment of the
diamond producing and purchasing nations, but also hinges upon the inte-
grity and dedication of the major diamond trading centers, such as Belgium
and Israel, to carefully scrutinize all imported diamonds to ensure that illegal
gems do not slip into the stream of commerce."' Currently, a major
problem rests in the fact that Belgium itself is not a participating member of
the KPCS. 4 9 In order to serve as a major diamond-trading center, Belgium
must support the KPCS in order to give the plan clout. Moreover, the laws
of the diamond trading hubs must effectively preclude illegal diamonds from
145 Id.
146 Diamonds.net, Rapaport News, International Coalition Issues Kiniberley Report Card (Feb. 13,
2002), at http/www.diamonds.net/news/newsitem.asp?num =6265&type=all&searchfor= Report&card
&author.
147 These effects include an increase in a country's gross domestic product, reduced inflation, as
well as decreased violence.
148 See Chris McGreal, Hopes and Fears as Plan to Ban War Gens Begins, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16,
2000, at 20.
149 See Kimberley Process: List of Participants, supra note 58.
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slipping into the stream of commerce.' Critics claim that current Belgian
laws are not consistently enforced and customs agents screen flights with a
"casual eye.' 5' This again demonstrates how, even though laws may be
enacted, there is no guarantee that they will be followed or even enforced;
or, if they are, that they will be vigorously enforced to prevent abuses. The
diamond industry must strictly police its own members in order to curtail
the "free rider" mentality, which eases the ability for some of the more
deceitful members of the diamond trade to engage in the illegal sale of blood
diamonds in the world's major trading centers.5 2
D) Diamond Producing Nations Must Maintain Tighter Control Over
Diamonds at the Source
Additionally, the governments of the diamond producing countries must
gain tighter control over their diamond mines to minimize the likelihood of
diamonds getting into the hands of people who will trade the diamonds for
arms. Unlike the excavation of natural resources such as copper, cobalt, and
oil, which require industrial scale machinery, diamond excavating requires
little to no technological assistance. 5 3  In the DRC, for example, the
diamond industry is so decentralized that thousands of miners sift through
loose soil for diamonds.'54 Since becoming a KPCS participant, and in an
effort to gain more control over the diamond industry, the DRC has
established the Center for Evaluation, Expertise, and Certification.155 Under
government supervision, diamond experts track and scrutinize legitimately
mined DRC rough diamonds, assigning each a precise value. 156 While the
Center has succeeded in tracking and valuing diamonds that make it to the
center, diamond experts say the Center and KPCS have done little to slow
the trade of illegal diamonds that never make it to the Center. 57 The process
of mining diamonds itself invites thievery and smuggling. Without more
control over the actual mining process at the mines themselves, DRC
ISO See Price, supra note 9, at 64.
151 See Elizabeth Bryant, Antwerp and Dirty Diamond Rumors, UNITED PRESS INT'L, March 7,
2002.
152 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 158.
153 See CHRISTIAN DIETRICH, HARD CURRENCY: THE CRIMINALIZED DIAMOND ECONOMY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND ITS NEIGHBORS 8 (Partnership Africa Canada,
The Diamonds and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper No. 4), available at http://www.
pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/hc_reporte.pdf.
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government regulators can do little to stop the robbery of diamonds each
year that never make it to the certification stage because they are first
smuggled out of the country.15 Once these diamonds are smuggled out of
the mines, they may be traded for arms by groups such as the Congolese
Rally for Democracy and the Congolese Liberation Movement, both of
whom have continued to be unaffected by the implementation of the
Kimberley Process. 59 The fact that these rebel groups continue to prosper
raises questions about whether a scheme to halt the influx of blood
diamonds can even be successful.
In order to more effectively curtail the blood diamond trade and the
stealing of diamonds from legitimate mining sites, security efforts within
diamond-producing nations must be implemented at diamond mines and
excavation sites. Botswana serves as a good example of a nation where the
government effectively secures all diamond mines by keeping a tight reign
over excavation. 16° The Botswanian mines are heavily guarded, and at the
end of each workday, all excavators are thoroughly searched for diamonds.
161
While government ownership alone has proven insufficient to completely
eliminate diamond stealing, 162 such government direction can help improve
the overall economies of these nations. 163  Close and non-corrupt
government supervision and inspection of the diamond miners and the
mining process from the beginning of the pipeline is an important aspect
necessary in minimizing the number of diamonds that reach the hands of
rebels, and will serve as a significant step toward economic growth.
E) The Kimberley Process Ignores the Fact that Incentives Make the World
Go Round
Yet another flaw of the current KPCS rests in the certificates themselves.
Certificates of authenticity, like those required of every parcel of dia-
158 See id.
159 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 153.
160 See Today Show: "Where in the World is Matt Lauer?" segment on Botswana (NBC television
broadcast, Feb.7, 2004).
161 See id.
162 For example, in the DRC in 2000, allegations arose of diamond theft from Miba, the state-
owned diamond company that accounts for about one quarter of the legitimate diamond exports. See
Orogun, supra note 5 at 153.
163 For example, in Sierra Leone, since the rebel disarmament and restoration of control of the
diamond mines to the government of Sierra Leone, the country's gross domestic product increased by
5.4 percent and inflation decreased sharply to three percent. See IMF UnblocksAidfor Sierra Leone, BBC
News, at http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1870259.stm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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monds,' 6 have in other markets been proven an ineffective method of
verifying the good's authenticity. 165 With regard to arms procurement, end-
user certificates are required of buyers and sellers, and must accompany
every sale. 166 Many African nations, 167 however, have repeatedly provided
false end-user certificates to disguise their arms shipments to rebels in Sierra
Leone, Angola, and the DRC. 168 These nations engage in such illegal trade
because rebel groups handsomely reward each country for participation. 169
Having demonstrated a history of disregard for the law, it is not unlikely that
these same countries would also falsify KPCS certificates if provided a good
enough incentive from rebel groups to do so. Thus, the certificates
themselves mean nothing. Therefore, the KPCS must provide participating
diamond producing nations some greater incentive to stay committed to the
Scheme, and deter such nations from succumbing to outside pressure and
influences.
One possible incentive is to incorporate into the KPCS a commitment
to reduce import limits on each diamond producing country's chief import,
in exchange for continued commitment to the KPCS. 170 The United
Nations could broker agreements between nations such as the DRC, and
their major trading partners, whereby trading requirements or taxes are
reduced.'7 ' Alternatively, importing requirements could be eliminated
completely, however, this is more extreme, and the idea would likely face
opposition from importing nations.
Additionally, a trade agreement mechanism could be incorporated into
the KPCS where, if any country violates the KPCS, all other participating
countries can retaliate against that violator by refusing to import goods from
that nation. The United States currently implements such a system through
its participation in the World Trade Organization. 172 Fear of a worldwide
164 See discussion supra Part IV.
165 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 158.
166 See id. at 159.
167 These nations include: Zaire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Ivory Coast, Republic of Congo, Liberia,
and Zambia. See id.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 According to THE WORLD FACTBOOK, the chief imports to the DRC are foodstuffs, mining
and other machinery, transport equipment, fuels, comprising about $933 million per year as of 2002.
CIA, THE WORLD F A C T B O O K, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html#Econ (last updated Feb. 10, 2005).
171 The major trading partners with the DRC are: Belgium, U.S., Zimbabwe, Finland, South
Africa, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Kenya. See id.
172 See 19 U.S.C.A. 2416 (2000).
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retaliation system could help motivate participating countries to follow the
KPCS requirements more stringently.
F) Diamond Fingerprinting Technology Needs Support
Importing countries, like the United States and other developed nations,
can help improve the effectiveness of the KPCS by encouraging science and
technology sectors to refine diamond identification technology so that each
diamond can be identified and tracked.'73 Tracking and identifying dia-
monds can provide a "check" on the certification process, and can prevent
abuse of the system. One way of tracking diamonds is through "geo-
chemical" identification.174 This scientific technology compares trace ele-
ments and impurities within diamonds in order to determine the region
from which they originate. 17  Technology such as this enables diamond
"fingerprinting.' 1 6 Another method, the "tagging" approach, uses laser and
focused ion bean technologies to mark each diamond at the source.
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Technologies such as these tend to lesson the fungible nature of diamonds
because, if utilized, all diamonds would be marked and identifiable.
Employing such marking procedures on all imported diamonds would
improve the ability to discern whether a diamond was from a country not
participating or violating the KPCS, and would discourage the blood
diamond trade. In addition to providing a marking system, such technology
would serve as a means of validating KPCS participant compliance by
verifying that a diamond is, in fact, from the country the accompanying
certificate claims. Advancements in science and technology create a
potential safeguard that currently does not exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although a good attempt, the current version of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS) fails to solve the worldwide problem of the
blood diamond trade. The KPCS operates as a system of national laws. The
Scheme can work, however, only to the extent that each participating nation
173 Amanda Bryant Banat, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed Market
Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 939,
947 (Fall 2002).
174 Id. (citing Nicolas Cook, Congressional Research Service, Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals
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enforces the ban on blood diamond trade at its own borders. Not surpris-
ingly, with so many politically and economically unstable and constantly
changing countries participating, the Scheme has not ended the blood
diamond trade. The main problem rests in expecting third-world-nations
to act like modernized countries. As a result, the pledge these nations make
to actively prevent the trade is nothing more than an empty promise. Even
though the intentions of the Scheme are sound, the system as it stands can
only provide a false sense of security for governments and consumers.7 8
The only way to effectively eradicate the influx of blood diamonds into the
world diamond market is by dismantling the tripartite alliance among the
peddlers of blood diamonds, the opportunistic arms dealers, and the tran-
sient countries. 7 9 Before this alliance can be broken, however, the nations
themselves must stabilize and learn to solve their national problems through
means other than rebellion and corruption. In order to stabilize, these
countries need investors to help legally and profitably utilize their natural
resources. Investors, however, are hesitant to invest in countries where the
risk of entanglement with political alliances is likely. 8° Therefore, this
dismantling cannot be achieved currently through any agreement between
nations, and therefore the KPCS will fail.
As drafted and implemented today, the KPCS cannot eliminate illegal
trade in rough diamonds. However, the attention generated from the KPCS
has, at the very least, initiated movement for change. In a recent press
release, chief prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo, of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), announced that the body would soon initiate an
investigation of companies and businesses located in at least 29 countries that
had been suspected of dealing in blood diamonds that were originally
extracted from the DRC.'8' According to Ocampo, "if [the alleged war-pro-
fiteering businesses] received diamonds and knew that the people delivering
them were getting them because of genocide then they could well be part of
the crime."' 82 The institution of legal action against such suspected
participants is the right step toward diminishing the blood diamond trade.
At the very least, the KPCS has helped limit and deter the practice of blood
178 See Price, supra note 9, at 66.
179 See Orogun, supra note 5, at 159.
180 See James Lamont, Congo's President Keen to Recruit New Generation of 'Clean' Foreign Investors,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at 8.
181 Firms Face 'Blood Diamond' Probe, BBC News, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3133108.stm (last updated Sept. 23, 2003). In a press release dated
June 23, 2004, the ICC announced the official opening of an investigation into the crimes committed
in the DRC. Int'l Criminal Ct, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First
Investigation (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease details&id =26&l = en.html.
182 Firms Face 'Blood Diamond' Probe, supra note 181.
2005]
242 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:217
diamond smuggling, clearing the path to the end of the blood diamond
problem. Now, the international diamond producing, buying, selling, and
trading community must continue the task of paving the road.
